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ABSTRACT 
The welfare of the United States is highly dependent upon its critical infrastructures and 
key resources. The Marine Transportation System is critical to the flow of commerce. 
The United States Coast Guard is charged with facilitating the protection of the Marine 
Transportation System from acts of terrorism under the Port, Waterways, and Coastal 
Security Mission. The Coast Guard faces the challenge of providing essential protection 
strategies with limited resources. 
Optimizing limited resources to provide maximum protection from deliberate 
attacks is a complex problem. In this thesis we explore various analytic techniques that 
can be used to provide guidance in resource allocation for defense against terrorism. We 
focus on two techniques, risk-based analysis and game theoretic analysis. We review the 
fundamental mathematical concepts and philosophical assumptions necessary for these 
techniques to be applicable.   
We review the Coast Guard’s role in the protection against potential terrorist 
attacks. Using a game theory approach, we build a model and present a preliminary 
analysis on the transportation of commerce along the Pittsburgh Three Rivers area.  
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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
A. UNITED STATES COAST GUARD 
1. Brief History 
The United States Coast Guard (USCG) has a rich history and significant role in 
defending our nation’s security and prosperity. Through our nation’s history, the Coast 
Guard has continued to modernize and adapt to serve the country’s changing needs. In 
1790 the Cutter Revenue Service was established to collect taxes from a newly formed 
nation and help other mariners in distress on the water. In 1915 the Cutter Revenue 
Service merged with the Life Saving Service, officially forming the United States Coast 
Guard. In 1939, the U.S. Lighthouse Service was brought under USCG purview, and then 
in 1942, the Bureau of Maritime Investigations and Navigation was added to the Coast 
Guard’s list of responsibilities. In 1967, the Coast Guard was moved from the 
Department of Treasury to the Department of Transportation (USCG, 2011b). Following 
the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, the Coast Guard, 
already a leader in maritime security, was moved to the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) to assist with anti-terrorism and infrastructure protection missions.  
Today, the Coast Guard is a maritime, military, multi-mission service unique 
among the military branches for having a maritime law enforcement mission (with 
jurisdiction in both domestic and international waters) and a federal regulatory agency 
mission in its mission set. It operates under the Department of Homeland Security during 
peacetime, and can be transferred to the Department of Defense, under the Navy, during 
time of war (USCG, 2011b). 
2. Broad View Mission Scope 
The Coast Guard is unique in its capacities and authorities to conduct missions in 
homeland defense, emergency response, maritime stewardship, and law enforcement. The 
Coast Guard’s enduring roles are maritime safety, maritime security, and maritime 
stewardship. To carry out those roles the Coast Guard has eleven statutory missions as 
defined in 6 U.S.C. § 468.   
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These missions include: 
• Search and Rescue (SAR), 
• Marine Environmental Protection (MEP), 
• Maritime Safety (MARSAFE), 
• Alien Migrant Interdiction Operations (AMIO),   
• Counter Drug (CD) / Counter Narco-Terrorism (CNT),  
• Other Law Enforcement (OLE), 
• Aids to Navigation (ATON),  
• Defense Readiness (DEFRED), 
• Living Marine Resources (LMR) 
• Polar Icebreaking Operations, and 
• Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security (PWCS).  
Of the missions listed above, we focus in this thesis on the protection of 
infrastructure under Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security (PWCS). Since joining DHS, 
the Coast Guard has made PWCS a primary mission alongside the longstanding Search 
and Rescue one.   
PWCS is the protection of the U.S. Maritime Domain and the U.S. 
Marine Transportation System (MTS) and those who live, work or 
recreate near them; the prevention and disruption of terrorist 
attacks, sabotage, espionage, or subversive acts; and response to 
and recovery from those that do occur. Conducting PWCS deters 
terrorists from using or exploiting the MTS as a means for attacks 
on U.S. territory, population centers, vessels, critical 
infrastructure, and key resources. PWCS includes the employment 
of awareness activities; counterterrorism, antiterrorism, 
preparedness and response operations; and the establishment and 
oversight of a maritime security regime. PWCS also includes the 
national defense role of protecting military out-load operations. 
(USCG, 2011c) 
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3. Challenges to the PWCS Mission 
a. Non-deliberate Hazards 
There are many non-deliberate maritime hazards such as those caused by 
nature, human error, or mechanical failure. Examples of non-deliberate hazards include 
hurricane damage to a port, a navigational error that causes a ship to run aground, or a 
draw bridge that fails to open and requires repair or replacement. The uncertainty of 
future events is typically addressed by focusing on prevention and response capacities in 
accordance to the frequency, location, and consequences of past events. Because 
historical data is typically available for these hazards, it is possible to characterize the 
frequency of these events in terms of probabilities.  
b. Deliberate Threats 
PWCS must also contend with deliberate acts committed against a person, 
group, system, or institution with the intent of causing harm. The United States has 
significantly less historical data available for these types of threats, making them harder 
to predict. Within the Coast Guard’s mission space, deliberate attacks are essentially acts 
of terrorism and/or crime; the USCG handles these through their roles in homeland 
security and law enforcement. 
4. Limited Resources for Operations 
Despite its wide scope of responsibilities, the Coast Guard remains a relatively 
small organization. The Coast Guard currently consists of only approximately 42,000 
active duty members (USCG, 2011b), comparable to the New York City Police 
Department (NYPD) with 34,000 uniformed officers (NYPD, 2011). The NYPD’s area of 
responsibility includes a 6,720 square mile grid (NYPD, 2011). The Coast Guard’s 
responsibility spreads over 950,000 miles of coastline to include 260,000 square miles of 
open-ocean, as well as numerous international and joint force operations (Coast Guard, 
2011a). The Coast Guard’s motto has always been to do more with less. However, as 
mission type and complexity continue to increase, USCG is reaching its limits with 
funding and personnel. These limitations prevent USCG from being able to conduct all its 
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missions with 100% effectiveness. Therefore, USCG must make judicious decisions to 
allocate limited resources to most effectively and efficiently conduct operations. To best 
manage and optimize limited resources, the Coast Guard must analyze each mission 
independently while maintaining balance across the whole system.   
Failure to allocate resources judiciously could create gaps within the United 
States maritime infrastructure defense. Exposed gaps have the potential to become prime 
targets for terrorists and may result in loss of life and/or devastating economic 
ramifications. The Coast Guard must find a way to make the best choices to ensure 
mission success.  
B. INFRASTRUCTURE DEFENSE 
The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) is a guiding framework for 
protecting the United States Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CI/KR). “The 
overarching goal of the NIPP is to build a safer, more secure, and more resilient America 
by preventing, deterring, neutralizing, or mitigating the effects of deliberate efforts by 
terrorists to destroy, incapacitate, or exploit elements of our nation’s CI/KR and to 
strengthen national preparedness, timely response, and rapid recovery of CI/KR in the 
event of an attack, natural disaster, or other emergency” (NIPP, 2009). 
The NIPP defines critical infrastructure as “the assets, systems, and networks 
whether physical or virtual, so vital to the U.S. that their incapacitation or destruction 
would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, public health or 
safety, or a combination thereof” (NIPP, 2009). There are currently 18 CI/KRs 
designated in the NIPP (e.g., Agriculture and Food, Banking and Finance, Chemical, 
Commercial Facilities). The NIPP includes all hazards and consists of two prongs. The 
first objective is to mitigate vulnerabilities by increasing resilience of structural and 
operational systems and improving medical preparedness. The second objective is to 
reduce consequences by increasing recovery and response actions in the wake of an 
attack, whether it is natural or deliberate. 
The cornerstone of the NIPP is its risk management. Risk assessment is an 
important means of prioritizing mitigation efforts, and NIPP risk management enables 
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risk-informed decisions to protect CI/KR. “This framework is applicable to threats such 
as natural disasters, manmade safety hazards, and terrorism, although different 
information and methodologies may be used to understand each” (NIPP, 2009). In 
general, NIPP addresses risk as a function of Threat (T), Vulnerability (V), and 
Consequences (C): 
   Risk  =  f (T, V, C).     
We will refer to models of this type as “TVC” models. The USCG, as an agency 
of DHS, operates under the guidance of NIPP. Accordingly, the Coast Guard uses a TVC 
model called Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model (MSRAM) as a decision tool for 
many of its missions to include PWCS (USCG, 2010). We review TVC models, 
including MSRAM, in Chapter II. 
The application of risk-based techniques to the study of infrastructure defense as 
applied to the PWCS mission would seem to follow naturally from the use of risk to 
study non-deliberate hazards. Risk-based techniques model the potential for loss from the 
perspective of a single decision-maker. Risk assessment is the process of quantifying the 
potential loss, while risk management is about taking action to mitigate those potential 
losses. A fundamental question is if and how the potential losses change with mitigation 
efforts. 
From 2000 to 2010 there has been considerable debate as to how best to account 
for uncertainty in the defense of CI/KR. Risk-based techniques work for non-deliberate 
hazards, such as industrial safety programs, finance, insurance, and engineering. 
However, the National Research Council (NRC) has criticized the use of risk-based 
techniques, and TVC models in particular, when assessing the potential consequences 
due to terrorism (NRC 2008, NRC 2010). At the heart of this criticism is a recognized 
need to model the decisions of both the attacker and the defender. Game theory has been 
proposed as an alternate technique for modeling these adversarial interactions, with 
specific application to randomized patrolling and system interdiction. We discuss these 
models in Chapter III. 
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C. CONTRIBUTIONS OF THESIS 
The objective of this thesis is to explore the problem space of PWCS and 
infrastructure defense, look at examples of the different methods currently being applied, 
and review the assumptions necessary to make these methods applicable. We analyze the 
pros and cons of risk-based and game theoretic techniques. We focus on the role and 
responsibilities of the United States Coast Guard as a major decision maker in protecting 
CI/KR within the ports, waterways, and coastal areas of the United States.   
Optimizing limited resources to provide maximum protection from deliberate 
attacks can be highly complex. In the way mariners require a navigation chart to safely 
plot a course to the desired destination, decision makers also need guidance in sorting 
through the many alternatives and constraints to meet their objectives optimally. 
Quantitative analysis can help provide key insight, but using quantitative analysis 
correctly can be tricky. Complicated mathematical models may distance the decision 
maker from actual input factors and the true meaning of the results produced. Ultimately, 
understanding when and how to use different models will lead to improved decision 
making and not merely the perception of better decision making.   
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II. RISKED BASED TECHNIQUES WITH EMPHASIS 
ON PROBABILISTIC RISK ANALYSIS 
A. ABREVIATED HISTORY OF RISK 
1. Origin of Risk Analysis 
Bernstein (1996, p. 90) observes that risk analysis has its origins in the 1600s 
when the flow of commerce began to move trans-oceanic. As trade demands increased so 
did the number of ships making the inherently dangerous voyages across the ocean. Due 
to the limited technology and emergence of piracy, a significant number of ships did not 
complete their voyage to deliver goods to their destinations. In London, England, Edward 
Lloyd created a list of scheduled shipments with prospective intelligence on conditions 
abroad and at sea. With information available, merchants and ship captains could 
determine if they wanted to take the risk of voyage. The concept of insurance was 
developed to keep commerce flow moving. Merchants would pay third parties a nominal 
amount to receive reimbursement for losses of merchandise experienced during the 
shipment. One-person insurance operators at the time became known as underwriters, 
and in order to ensure that money could be made, the underwriters had to analyze the 
odds for insuring the risk taker.   
Simultaneously, the desire to quantify personal risk came to the forefront of 
mathematics. These factors led to the development of probability theory. Insurers began 
using probabilities to conduct risk analysis to make decisions (e.g., Bernstein, 1996, pp. 
89–91). Since then, insurance companies have been flourishing, using a disciplined risk 
analysis approach known today as actuarial science (e.g., Hubbard, 2009, p. 59).  
Actuarial science was perhaps the first quantitative risk assessment technique. 
Taking a closer look, this kind of assessment can be broken down into two elements: 
1. Consequences:  Magnitude and/or severity 
2. Likelihood: Probability of occurrence of each consequence  
Because the word “risk” can be used in many contexts, it is difficult to define 
precisely, and even more challenging to represent mathematically. As defined by DHS, 
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risk is “the potential for an unwanted outcome resulting from an incident, event, or 
occurrence, as determined by its likelihood and the associated consequences” (DHS, 
2010).  
2. Probabilistic Risk Analysis 
Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) evaluates and quantifies risks associated with 
complex systems. Kaplan and Garrick (1981) introduce the following questions for 
discussing risk: 
1. What can go wrong? 
2. How likely is it that it will happen? 
3. If it does happen, what are the consequences? 
Collectively, the {scenario, likelihood, consequence} answers form a “triplet” that 
can be used to assess risk. All PRA models use elements of likelihood and consequence, 
where likelihood is typically derived from the observation of frequency or by subjective 
evaluation from subject matter experts.     
In the 1960s and 1970s, industries began to focus on reducing risk to improve 
efficiency and safety for workers and the industry (Garrick, 1984). Industries 
accumulated data on failure rates and hazards which made PRA a natural next step in 
modeling risk. Rasmussen (1976) concludes that PRA can be an appropriate and useful 
tool when constructing safeguards in the nuclear power industry; this led to the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission implementing a “PRA Procedures Guide” in 1983 (Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, 2011). Other safety programs, including one in the airline 
industry, began using PRA to assess risk (GAIN, 2003). PRA became a popular tool in 
engineering to help predict system and component failure due to predicted life cycle 
lengths and random events.  
By the mid-1980s, probabilistic risk-based techniques were prevalent in 
insurance, finance, and engineering. 
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B. QUANTITATIVE MEASURES OF RISK 
To understand the mathematics of PRA, we will look at a single binary model, 
where we introduce some basic notation that is used in this thesis. Then, we look at some 
qualitative properties of PRA under multiple scenarios. 
1. Risk as Expected Loss 
Let X be a random variable representing the loss that we incur in an uncertain 
future. If the future has discrete outcomes, then X is a discrete random variable. 
The simplest case is where X takes on two possible outcomes, a value C > 0 or 0, 
with probabilities: 
                         ݌ݎ݋ܾሼܺ ൌ ܥሽ ൌ ݌  and 
   ݌ݎ݋ܾሼܺ ൌ 0ሽ ൌ 1 െ ݌. 
The expected value of X is therefore: 
   ܧሼܺሽ ൌ ݌ ൈ ܥ	 ൅ ሺ1 െ ݌ሻ ൈ 0. 
Because the second term is zero, this is equivalent to: 
   ܧሼܺሽ ൌ ݌ ൈ ܥ.  
In words, the expected loss is equal to “probability times consequence.” 
This definition extends naturally to multiple outcomes. Let ݅ ൌ 1, 2, 3, … , ܰ index 
the possible future outcomes. Let ݌௜ represent the probability that outcome i occurs, with 
∑ 	݌௜ ൌ 1ே௜ୀଵ . In other words, these outcomes are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. Let 





Again, we can compute the expected loss according to “probability times 
consequence.”  
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2. Risk Curves 
The expected loss across multiple scenarios is consistent with the notion of 
“triplets” introduced by Kaplan and Garrick (1981). In review, the idea is to characterize 
the uncertain future in terms of ሼݏܿ݁݊ܽݎ݅݋, ݈݈݄݅݇݁݅݋݋݀, ܿ݋݊ݏ݁ݍݑ݁݊ܿ݁ሽ triplets that 
collectively answer the questions:  What can go wrong?  How likely is it to happen?  
What are the consequences if it does? 
Kaplan and Garrick (1981) argue that probabilistic risk is a function of the entire 
probability distribution and not just a point estimate given by the expected value. They 
observe, “a single number is not a big enough concept to communicate risk. It takes a 
whole curve, or actually a family of curves, to communicate the idea of risk.”  Kaplan & 
Garrick (1981) propose the use of a risk curve to represent the entire probability 
distribution. More specifically, they define a risk curve by ܲݎ݋ܾሼܺ ൒ ܽሽ for all values 
ܽ ൒ 0. Thus, a risk curve is the complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) 
of the random variable X. 
We review a simplified example that demonstrates how risk curves can change 
with scenarios and how a mean value estimate does not reveal the overall risks. Some of 
the possible non-deliberate hazards the USCG must contend with in waterways and 
coastal regions include “collisions, allisions, and groundings” (USCG, 2008). Here we 
focus on vessel groundings and vessel collisions. Assuming these hazards are non-
deliberate each can be caused by human error, environmental conditions, mechanical 
failure, or a combination thereof. The possible losses from each hazard include life, 
environmental pollution, waterway closure, and economic impacts.   
We start our example by producing a risk curve for vessel groundings. Consider 
the notional data in Table 1, which provides hypothetical assessments of damages 
incurred from vessel groundings. Table 2 shows a notional assessment for damages 
incurred from vessel collisions. Assume that subject matter experts have assessed a 




risk curve that shows the losses over a range of scenarios. We plot the complementary 
cumulative probability for the varying order of consequences. Figure 1 is the risk curve 
for vessel groundings. 
 
  Consequence ($K) Probability CCDF 
  0 0.05 1 
  10 0.05 0.95 
Vessel Grounding 20 0.1 0.9 
  30 0.2 0.8 
  40 0.3 0.6 
  50 0.3 0.3 
  Expected loss: $35.5K   
Table 1.   Notional Risk of Vessel Groundings 
 
Figure 1.   Risk Curve for Vessel Grounding. Each point represents the 
complementary cumulative probability of expected loss. For example, this curve 





















Risk Curve:  Vessel Grounding
Grounding
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Figure 2 compares the risk curves of vessel groundings and vessel collisions on 
one chart, thus showing how the two risk curves vary with scenarios and comparing total 
expected damage as functions of probability of occurrence.  
  
  Consequence ($K) Probability CCDF 
  0 0.235 1 
  10 0.035 0.765 
  20 0.05 0.73 
Vessel Collision 30 0.13 0.68 
  40 0.1 0.55 
  50 0.2 0.45 
  65 0.25 0.25 
  Expected loss: $35.5K   
Table 2.   Notional Risk of Vessel Collisions 
 



























Risk is often quantified as a point estimate according to the expected loss as	ܧሼܥሽ. 
In our nominal example, we face an expected loss of $35.5K for both vessel groundings 
and vessel collisions. In expectation, the risks are equal, but the curves in Figure 2 clearly 
show that the overall risks are not the same. There is a 75% probability of a non-zero loss 
from vessel collision while there a 95% probability of non-zero loss from a grounding 
event. Figure 2 also shows that vessel grounding has a probability of 0.71 of exceeding 
the expected loss while vessel collision has only a 0.62 probability of exceeding the 
expected loss. We could interpret this to mean a vessel grounding event is a higher risk 
than a collision event. But, we also observe that a vessel collision event results in greater 
consequences when an event does occur. Though risk curves present useful information, 
the use of probabilistic risk does not make it clear how to compare risks. 
Risk curves can be viewed across multiple categories and scenarios; a risk curve 
generalizes to a risk surface with much more information available to the decision maker 
than a single expected value (Kaplan & Garrick, 1981). These concepts commonly appear 
in other forms of PRA used in industrial safety and engineering programs. 
3. Event Trees 
Event trees provide a graphical depiction of random outcomes, and are frequently 
used in PRA models (e.g., Parnell, 2008). An event tree represents a sequence of random 
variables, called events. We represent each event visually using a node. Each random-
event branching node is followed by the possible random-variable realizations, called 
outcomes, with an arc leading from the branching, predecessor node, to the next, 
successor-event node. The path from the root to a particular leaf is called a scenario. 
Under the assumption that each event is independent, the probability that a specific path 
is taken is the probability the scenario occurs, and it is calculated by the product of each 
condition met along the scenario path. Figure 3 shows a simple example of an event tree 




Figure 3.   Event Tree for Vessel Grounding 
The event tree is a simple form that can show the respective probabilities of 
different events that can occur. Decision trees are formatted in the same way as event 
trees, but have an additional type of node called a decision node where a decision maker 
can choose which branch to follow. In a decision tree, a decision maker can influence the 
path from the root node to the leaf node, in order to seek a specific outcome. 
C. RISK MANAGEMENT 
DHS defines risk management as the “process of identifying, analyzing, 
assessing, and communicating risk and accepting, avoiding, transferring or controlling it 
to an acceptable level at an acceptable cost” (DHS, 2010). The primary goal of risk 
management is to reduce or eliminate risk through mitigation measures intended to avoid 
or reduce expected loss (DHS, 2010). Hubbard (2009) discusses many different ways to 
manage risk; we focus on probabilistic risk analysis modeling. Techniques like PRA are 
useful for managing risk by producing quantifiable risk values, enabling a decision maker 
to manage risks by comparing risk values. 
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1. Priority Ranking of Risks 
One method for managing risks is to quantify all known risks according to their 
expected loss, and then order them in a prioritized list. To construct a prioritized risk 
ranking of different events, decision makers must assess the events using a common form 
of measure, such as money. To fully assess and compare risks, intangible costs are 
translated into quantified values. The cost of a human life and psychological effects from 
a significant event are two examples of costs that are subject to interpretation. With a 
common mode of measure, all scenarios and missions can be compared relative to each 
other. 
Given a priority ranking, the decision maker may choose to apply resources to 
mitigate the highest ranked risk first and then work down the prioritized list depending on 
resource availability (Cox, 2009, p. 357). 
2. Risk Scoring Techniques  
A common approach to risk management is to use risk scores. A risk score is a 
discrete numerical value that has been converted from a continuous probability of an 
associated risk (Hubbard, 2009, pp. 118–122). Risk scores allow decision makers to 
quickly review and manage the risks in a format that is understood by the organization 
(Hubbard, 2009, p. 120). Risks from multiple scenarios and missions are set to the same 
scale and mode of measure as specified by the scoring format being used. As priority 
ranking produces relative comparison, risk scoring techniques are used to provide 
absolute comparisons.  
One idea of risk scores is to convert probability and consequence numbers to 
ordinal scales. For example, risks may be converted from expected loss value to a scale 
that ranks it from one to five. A risk matrix is a common form to display risks on an 
ordinal scale (Cox, 2008a). With risks presented in a simplified numerical format, the 
decision maker can manage risks by directly comparing ordinal numbers. The decision 
maker may set a threshold number that is a “go” or “no go” for the risk being assessed. 
Another technique frequently used is to define ranges of risk scores (e.g., risk score 
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ranges may be defined as green=0–10, yellow=11–15, and red=16–20). The decision 
maker will take certain action depending on what range the risk score falls into.     
The USCG uses PRA to form Risk Index Numbers (RIN) (USCG, 2010). The 
RIN for the USCG is a basic unit of risk that represents an expected loss of $1 million 
dollars over the course of a year (USCG, 2010, p. 9). RINs are used as a common risk 
currency between all missions with measurable consequences. In this way, for example, 
the USCG can compare risks of drug trafficking to those of terrorism and focus their 
resources accordingly. Operational assets in the USCG utilize color-coded risk score 
cards called Green-Amber-Red (GAR) to assess risks before conducting a specific 
mission. RINs are used for long term planning while GAR assessments are used for daily 
mission planning. 
3. Cost Effectiveness of Risk Management 
Risk-based approaches can track cost effectiveness for risk mitigation efforts 
(Dillon, Liebe, & Bestafka, 2009). Conducting repeated assessments shows the changes 
in risk scores, which can be compared to the costs of the mitigating actions applied since 
previous assessments.  “MSRAM assessments are conducted annually and provide 
important components of the USCG’s biennial National Maritime Strategic Risk 
Assessment (NMSRA)” (USCG, 2008b). The USCG uses the MSRAM tool to determine 
RINs to measure cost effectiveness of policies and mitigating actions implemented the 
previous year by reviewing the change in RINs (GAO, 2011). 
4. Pitfalls in Risk Scoring 
Risk scoring presents numerous challenges to accuracy and in some cases can 
lead to the mismanagement of risks (Hubbard, 2009, pgs 122–123). Risk values that are 
derived by subject matter experts vice those obtained through historical data will be 




(1) Risk preferences. Is the subject matter expert risk neutral, risk 
adverse, or risk preferred? 
(2) Failure of experience. Assessments made by human opinion will be 
swayed by personal experience leading to unconscious heuristics and 
subject preferences. 
(3) Failure of interpretation. Undefined subjectivity leads to varying 
interpretation between subject matter experts. Lack of precise 
language leads to varying transformations from verbal assessments 
(i.e., strong possibility) to quantifiable value assessments (i.e., 
probability of 0.7) . 
(4) Emotional attachment to a cause. 
(5) Overconfidence or lack of confidence. 
(6) Tendency to assign extreme score values to those risks being 
evaluated last. 
Outside this human element, transforming risk values to a specified risk scoring 
format presents numerous mathematical deficiencies (Hubbard, 2009, p. 122). 
Conversions of risk values to an ordinal scale causes range value compression, by 
requiring rounding off to get whole numbers within the desired scale. Components within 
a discrete risk score can have distinct risk priorities before conversion and then be equal 
when analyzed on a discrete ordinal scale. For example, assume risk values are converted 
to a risk score of 1 to 5. One scenario evaluates to 2.9 and another scenario evaluates to 
3.3, but to fit in the risk score format, both conditions are converted to 3, losing fidelity 
of assessments.   
Any mathematical function applied to risk scores increases the level of inaccuracy 
and leads to increasingly arbitrary values (Hubbard, 2009, p. 124). Risk score values that 
have been compressed no longer have the same arithmetic properties. If adding risk 
scores together, the risk value conversion must be accounted for, else the results are 
drastically different than the true assessments (Hubbard, 2009, p. 130).   
D. TERRORISM RISK 
1. History 
The terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, shifted attention 
to modeling deliberate attacks by terrorists and prompted the President to form the 
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Department of Homeland Security. The newly formed DHS began looking at quantifiable 
methods to assess risk. In the last decade, leaders and analysts have made significant 
efforts to quantify the risks of terrorism and determine the cost effectiveness of the 
policies used to combat those risks (Ezell et al., 2010).  
Pate-Cornell and Guikema (2002) present the idea that probability of damage 
from terrorist attacks can be assessed the same way as probability of damage from a non-
deliberate hazard.  “Given the scarcity of the experience base regarding terrorist attacks 
in the present context, the emphasis is on the model’s reasoning and structure rather than 
on the numerical values” (Pate-Cornell & Guikema, 2002). For example, under direction 
from the Coast Guard Maritime Security and Response Manual (MSRO), the USCG 
conducts annual assessments of risk involving a water-born IED terrorist attack in major 
U.S. ports. To date, there has never been a terrorist attack in a U.S. port using water-born 
IEDs. With no historical data available, the USCG solicits opinions from subject matter 
experts to estimate probabilities of attack. In general, to conduct probabilistic modeling 
of terrorist attacks where there is very limited historical data, the only option is to analyze 
the current terrorist threat to estimate the probability of damage. 
In 2002 the U.S. Congress asked the American Society of Mechanical Engineers 
(ASME) to assist the DHS in developing a method to assess and manage the threat of 
terrorism in the United States (ASME, 2011). In response, the ASME founded the 
Innovative Technologies Institute (ITI). ITI produced the Risk Analysis and Management 
for Critical Asset Protection (RAMCAP) to assess the nation’s critical infrastructure to 
determine how to best focus efforts and resources to protect the United States from future 
terrorist attacks (ASME, 2011). RAMCAP was one of the first analysis models to use 
TVC to quantify terrorism risk.   
In 2006, DHS established the National Infrastructure Protection Plan. The NIPP 
provides guidance for all DHS entities to analyze terrorism risk using threat, 
vulnerability, and consequence assessments (NIPP, 2009). With the NIPP as its guidance, 
the Coast Guard developed an asset-level decision tool called Maritime Security Risk 
Analysis Model (MSRAM) (USCG, 2010).  
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In a TVC model, a risk scenario is typically characterized by the probability that a 
specific target is attacked in a specific way during a specified time period (NIPP, 2009). 
Due to uncertainties, threat can be represented as a probability (that an attack occurs) as a 
single point estimate, or with a probability distribution (Willis, 2007). Vulnerability is 
measured by the probability that an “asset, system, network, or entity is susceptible to 
disruption, destruction, or exploitation” (DHS 2010).  “Consequence is the magnitude 
and type of damage resulting from successful terrorist attacks” (Willis, 2007). A TVC 
model assesses an expected loss value. Greater expected losses equate to higher risk 
values.   
2. Mathematical Representation of Terrorism Risk 
Recall our previous definition of risk as expected loss: ܴ݅ݏ݇ ൌ 	∑ ݌௜ܥ௜௜ . 
The common form of terrorism risk as championed in the NIPP is: 
ܴ݅ݏ݇ ൌ ݂ሺܶ, ܸ, ܥሻ. 
The TVC model was derived mathematically by using probability theory. One 
method to determine ݌௜ for terrorism risk is to separate it into two separate probabilities, 
the probability that an attack occurs, and the conditional probability that an attack causes 
damage (Willis, 2007). The probability of attack can be based on the attacker’s 
objectives, constraints, capabilities, etc. The probability that an attack causes damage can 
include assessments of the target’s resilience, the means of attack, countermeasures in 
place, etc. Using Bayes Theorem, terrorism risk can be expressed as (Willis 2007): 
ܴ݅ݏ݇ ൌ ܲݎ݋ܾ	ሼܽݐݐܽܿ݇ሽ ൈ ܲݎ݋ܾሼ݀ܽ݉ܽ݃݁|ܽݐݐܽܿ݇ሽ ൈ ܧሾ݀ܽ݉ܽ݃݁|݀ܽ݉ܽ݃݅݊݃	ܽݐݐܽܿ݇ሿ. 
Under the assumption that threat, vulnerability, and consequence are independent, 
the terrorism risk function can be written: 
ܴ݅ݏ݇ ൌ ܲݎ݋ܾ	ሼܽݐݐܽܿ݇ሽ ൈ ܲݎ݋ܾ	ሼ݀ܽ݉ܽ݃݁ሽ ൈ ܧሾ݀ܽ݉ܽ݃݁ሿ. 
By the definitions under the DHS lexicon, terrorism risk can be rewritten as: 
ܴ݅ݏ݇ ൌ ݄ܶݎ݁ܽݐ ൈ ܸݑ݈݊݁ݎܾ݈ܽ݅݅ݐݕ ൈ ܥ݋݊ݏ݁ݍݑ݁݊ܿ݁. 
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3. Currently Used TVC models 
RAMCAP is on its third iteration, remaining an overarching model for defense of 
critical infrastructure from terrorist attacks and all non-deliberate hazards (ASME, 2011). 
RAMCAP was initially created to assist the DHS in terrorism risk analysis but has been 
expanded to all hazards to help government and commercial industries to manage all 
types of risk (ASME, 2011). 
MSRAM is designed to analyze terrorism risk specific to the Coast Guard’s area 
of responsibilities. Where RAMCAP was intended to have a broader overarching 
analysis, MSRAM is intended to be utilized at the operational asset level. USCG 
operational units complete annual MSRAM assessments at which time field experts input 
new values for threat, vulnerability, and consequences for all CI/KR within the Coast 
Guard’s operational domain. The USCG uses MSRAM to review current mission 
responsibilities and prioritize areas of focus (USCG, 2010).  
The Antiterrorism Risk Based Decision Aid (ARDA) model was developed to 
assess investments for protecting U.S. Navy assets, and “determine whether the most 
effective anti-terrorism alternatives are being used to reduce the risk to the facilities and 
war-fighting assets” (Dillon, Liebe, & Bestafka, 2009). ARDA introduces value 
preference trade-offs in the PRA model in the form of a risk utility function (Dillon, 
Liebe, & Bestafka, 2009). A utility function will place a higher risk value on assets that 
are more important to the decision maker. Under the ARDA model, specific risk with a 
probability p and consequence C can be represented as: 
ܴ݅ݏ݇ ൌ ݌ ൈ ݑሺܥሻ. 
Using a multi-attribute utility analysis, ARDA allows for input into risk 
preferences. A risk matrix is built with utility of consequences that can be multiplied by 
the probability of a linear scenario. ARDA looks to integrate a utility function with the 
Department of Defense more granular approach to assess vulnerability, called Detection-
Assess-Warn-Defend-Recover (DAWDR) (Dillon et al., 2009). 
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 E. CRITICISM OF THE TVC MODEL 
In the past decade, the TVC models for terrorism analysis have gained 
considerable momentum. While there are many who have contributed notable 
refinements to this terrorism risk assessment, there have also been many who have noted 
significant deficiencies in the concepts of terrorism risk.   
The National Academy of Sciences is a non-profit society of distinguished 
scholars dedicated to improving scientific and engineering research for the general 
welfare. In 2006, the U.S. Congress asked the National Research Council (NRC) of the 
National Academies to review DHS’s TVC risk analysis used in Biological Terror Risk 
Analysis (BTRA). NRC reported concerns about “mathematical and statistical mistakes, 
unnecessarily complicated probability models, and models with fidelity far exceeding 
existing data” (NRC, 2008).   
Following the NRC’s 2008 BTRA report, the U.S. Congress asked that the NRC 
conduct a review of all the activities of DHS related to risk analysis (NRC, 2010). In the 
2010 report, the NRC noted “many weaknesses in risk analysis, modeling of intelligent 
agents, consequence assessment, and presentation of assessment results that make the 
results problematic even for assessing a single agent threat.”  In short, the NRC concludes 
that Risk = f(TVC) is adequate for analysis of natural hazards but is not yet validated for 
analysis of terrorism, and the formula may not be on the “correct trajectory to ensure 
reliable risk analyses” (NRC, 2010).   
The concerns of terrorism risk analysis are essentially philosophical, practical, 
and mathematical. We review these deficiencies in some detail. 
1. Assumption that Terrorists Act Randomly 
In his original work on nuclear safety, Rasmussen (1976), states that in order for 
PRA to be valid, we must assume that failures are basically random in nature. With the 
assumption of a random attack we can use an appropriate mathematical combination of 
known attack rates (Rasmussen, 1976). However, Rasmussen also notes that “in the case 
of deliberate human action, as in imagined diversion scenarios, such an assumption is 
surely not valid” (Rasmussen, 1976).   
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Using probabilistic analysis for terrorism implies that an attacker acts as a random 
variable according to a fixed probability distribution. However, we know that an 
intelligent adversary can launch an attack when timing and conditions are optimal, thus 
maximizing expected damage. Modeling an attacker as a random variable produces an 
estimated mean for vulnerability and consequence. An estimated mean will not reflect an 
attacker who waits until conditions are optimal, because the “optimal” conditions as 
viewed by the attacker are often different from the “normal” conditions reflected in the 
mean (Cox, 2008b).    
In TVC models, probabilities assigned to threat scenarios are static in nature. 
However, attackers can alter their intent as more information becomes available to them. 
For example, assume there are three conditions that must be met before a terrorist 
attempts an attack. The attack is assessed by the defender at given probability before the 
attacker sees any of the conditions met. An attacker’s probability of success prior to the 
conditions being met is 0.2 but after conditions 1 and 2 are met the probability of success 
is 0.7 and after condition 3 is met the probability of success increases to 0.9. As each 
condition is met the attacker’s intention to conduct the attack increases significantly. 
Static probabilities do not account for the attacker’s learning curve or changing 
conditions.   
Terrorism risk analysis assigns probabilities to attacks without accounting for the 
decision process of the attacker. Some models, such as MSRAM, update estimates 
annually, which does not account for what the attacker learns over the course of that time 
period.   If a resource is invested properly to defend an asset, the attacker may no longer 
intend to attack that asset which changes the probability of attack (Cox, 2008b). If the 
attacker knows what is being defended then the attacker will not act as a random variable 
and thus expected loss calculations will be incorrect (Cox, 2008b). 
2. Insufficient Methods for Predicting the Attacker 
Probabilistic analysis often uses historical data to derive probabilities through 
regression analysis. In the case of PRA, where historical data is not available, attempting 
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to solve probabilities through regression will result in over-fitting, producing results that 
are useless for real world applications (Brown & Cox, 2011).   
Cox (2008b) states that trying to assess probabilities for intelligent adversaries 
who adaptively pursue their goals as information and experience change, can produce 
mistaken risk estimates. A prioritized risk scheme could be learned by the attacker, 
influencing the attacker’s decisions, which may change the probabilities or may result in 
a self-fulfilling prediction by the defender (Brown & Cox, 2011). 
Threat probabilities derived by the defender can be different from the 
probabilities the attacker eventually acts upon (Brown & Cox, 2011). Even when 
defender experts give unbiased probability estimates based on viable intelligence, the 
attacker’s decision tree is conditioned on different information (Brown & Cox, 2011).  
“Intelligence analysts cannot condition on knowledge that they do not have” (Brown & 
Cox, 2011). Attack probabilities actually depend on what the attacker knows or believes 
and not on what the defender knows or believes. The key issue is that we don’t know 
what decision strategy the attacker is using, and the threat and vulnerability probabilistic 
assessment by the defender could be misleading (Brown & Cox, 2011).  
The RAMCAP notion of threat is based on intention and capability of an 
adversary to undertake actions that would be detrimental to an asset or population 
(ASME, 2011). This calculation may be valid if we know who the adversaries are and we 
know their intentions. Assuming we know who all the adversaries are, determining the 
adversaries’ capabilities requires a constant game of cat and mouse. Our best efforts may 
not reveal the adversaries’ capacities and intentions entirely.   In practice, we don’t know 
who all of our adversaries are. We don’t know the information the adversary has against 
us. The magnitude of uncertainty about the attacker makes probability estimates grossly 
inaccurate. The following example shows how an attacker’s strategy produces different 
results from the defender’s prioritized risk values. Figure 4 is a decision tree that 
represents three targets that are being assessed for possible attack.  
• Let Targets A, B, and C be assets the defender wants to protect and a potential 
adversary wants to attack. 
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• Consider two different attackers. Attacker 1 is patient and well trained. Attacker 1 
will wait until the optimal moment to complete the tasks and will choose the 
target with the highest probability of success. Attacker 2 has less experience and 
desires to cause the maximum amount of damage. 
• The probability of a successful attack is equivalent to ܶ ൈ ܸ. The defender 
completes assessments for each target. 
• Assume the defender correctly estimates likelihood of attack for Targets A and B.   
• Assume Attacker 1 knows something about Target C that the defender does not 
know, giving a different assessment of the probability of success for attacking of 
Target C.  
 
 
Figure 4.   Example Attacker and Defender Prioritization 
Even in this simple example, we observe inconsistency in the perspective of these 
players. 
• Defender prioritizes defending targets by risk values from highest to lowest as: 
1. Target B 2. Target A 3. Target  C 
• Attacker 1 prioritizes Target attacks by best probability of success as: 
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1. Target C 2. Target A 3. Target B 
• Attacker 2 prioritizes Target attacks by maximum damage as: 
1. Target B 2. Target C 3. Target A 
From this simple example, the assumption that we know the decision process and 
capabilities of the adversary misleads us in the priority of targets we decide to defend. 
Under the TVC model, Target B receives the highest risk value. The defender allocates 
additional patrol assets to Target B. Attacker 1 determines Target C is the softest target 
and chooses to attack C. Attacker 2 chooses the target with the greatest estimated damage 
therefore prioritizes Target C above Target A.   
3. TVC Models Fail Established Mathematical Principles and Axioms 
Cox (2008b) discusses fundamental limitations of the Risk = f(TVC) formula:  
“These limitations include the model’s failure to adjust for correlations among its 
components, non-additivity of risks estimated using the formula, inability to use risk-
scoring results to optimally allocate defensive resources, and intrinsic subjectivity and 
ambiguity of Threat, Vulnerability, and Consequence numbers.”   
(Cox, 2008b) demonstrates how TVC, such as RAMCAP can reverse the 
prioritization of risks by attempting to average an upper and lower bound for 
vulnerability and consequence. The following is an example of this violation (Cox, 
2008b): 
 Target A: (Vulnerability = .25, Consequence = $400M) 
 Target B: (Vulnerability = 1, Consequence = $60M) 
Conditional Risk = V ൈC 
 Target A = ($100M)  Target B = $60M 
If we know the precise probability for the vulnerability, we see that Target A is a 
higher risk than Target B. But suppose we have uncertainty about the values of 
vulnerability and consequence. RAMCAP dictates that we introduce upper and lower 
bounds then use a uniform distribution to find a mean value. For example, 
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 Target A = ((.25 + .125)/2) ൈ (400+200)/2)  =  $56.25M 
 Target B = ((.9+1)/2) ൈ (50+100)/2)   =  $71.25M 
Now Target B is a higher risk than Target A. The two targets’ priorities have been 
reversed due to an attempt to average uncertain vulnerability and consequence values. 
Lowder (2010) discusses how TVC as used by the Department of Energy violates 
probability calculus axioms. Most notably, in order for TVC to be a correct mathematical 
expression, independence must be established between each probability. The assumption 
of independence of threat, vulnerability, and consequence indicates that the attacker 
makes a decision to attack a target without consideration to success or impact. Yet threat 
is calculated by assessing an adversary’s intent and capabilities. Unless the attacker’s 
intentions are explicitly demonstrated through statements or intelligence, we are forced to 
assess his intentions according to our value system. The defender values targets that are 
considered vulnerable and/or carry a significant consequence. Innately, these parameters 
are going to creep into any assessment of threat that is made. This indicates that the threat 
assessment is conditioned on the defender’s vulnerability and consequence values of the 
asset being defended. The axiom of probability independence is violated, meaning: 
ܴ݅ݏ݇ ൌ ܲݎ݋ܾ	ሼܽݐݐܽܿ݇ሽ ൈ ܲݎ݋ܾ	ሼ݀ܽ݉ܽ݃݁ሽ ൈ ܧሾ݀ܽ݉ܽ݃݁ሿ  ് ܶ ൈ ܸ ൈ ܥ 
By the assumption of independence, the risk calculation neglects to account for 
covariance. Cox (2008b) presents the following simple example.   
Assume T=0.5, V=0.5, and C=0.5. Assuming independence, then risk as 
calculated by TVC equals 0.125. If we assume perfectly positively correlated threat 
values where T=C and T=V, then the expected value of their product is 0.5 not 0.125. 
Likewise, if threat values are perfectly negatively correlated then T=C and V=1-C, then 
the expected value of TVC equals 0. Dependencies among the components could produce 
results ranging from 0 to 0.5, which may be significantly different than the independent 
calculation of 0.125. TVC models may easily overshoot or undershoot actual values 
based on correlations not being accounted for (Cox, 2008b).  
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TVC models can fail when assessing scenarios with low probabilities and high 
consequences (Dillon et al., 2009). If a consequence is large, any minor change in the 
probability can greatly change its risk score and its place on a prioritized ranking.   
4. TVC Models are Disconnected from Management Actions 
Priority ranking from PRA may not support effective resource allocation due to 
budget constraints (Cox, 2008b). Terrorism risk models are frequently used to develop 
prioritized actions based on risk scores. To reduce the maximum amount of risk possible, 
risk managers will try to implement measures to reduce the highest risk scores. Budget 
constraints may limit the possible mitigation strategies. The limitations could prevent the 
optimal cost effectiveness for risk reduction.   
Cox (2008b) presents the following example:  
A defender considers implementing countermeasures to reduce risk. The defender 
is presented with the following: 
• Countermeasure A reduces expected loss by $20 per year, and costs defender $3. 
• Countermeasure B reduces expected loss by $25 per year, and costs defender $2. 
• Countermeasure C reduces expected loss by $40 per year, and costs defender $4. 
Implementation of countermeasures may be limited by budget constraints. We 
consider budgets of $3, $4, $5, $6, and $9. If the defender has a budget of only $3, then 
he can afford only B. Given a budget of $4, the defender is better off choosing C. But 
with a budget of $5 the defender can achieve the best results by picking A and B. Table 3 






b A B C 
$3    1   
$4      1 
$5  1 1   
$6    1 1 
$9  1 1 1 
Table 3.   Budget driven countermeasure example (From Cox 2008b). The optimal 
combination of defensive investments depends on the budget available to invest. 
A “greedy” investment strategy based on a prioritized list of investments leads to 
inefficient use of resources. 
The budget sensitive countermeasure example presented in Cox (2008b) shows us 
“that no evaluation of risk-reducing options can allocate resources effectively without 
considering budget (and other) dependencies” (Cox (2008b). In other words using 
prioritized ranking or other risk scores to implement countermeasures may lead to 
inefficient cost effectiveness. 
Risk scores used for risk management can give the decision maker an idea of 
relative importance, but the representational numbers are often arbitrary. For instance, 
what does it mean to reduce a risk score from 80 to 70?  A change in scores may indicate 
a cause and effect from the decisions made, but it doesn’t tell the decision maker 
anything about what is built into those scores or how to specifically address them. In 
other words, risk scores can distance the decision maker from understanding the real 
problem.   
F. SUMMARY OF CONCERNS FOR TERRORISM APPLICATIONS 
There are many challenges in determining accurate values for risk analysis 
calculations as discussed in Hubbard (2009). Historical data is generally used to derive 
and support probability values in other uses of PRA, but there is not sufficient historical 
data available to derive probabilities for terrorist attacks. Currently available terrorism 
risk analysis techniques typically require the following assumptions: 
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(1)  The attacker only knows what the defender knows,  
(2)  Threat, Vulnerability, and Consequence are independent components, and 
(3)  The attacker’s decision process is the same as the defender’s decision 
 process. 
These assumptions are difficult if not impossible to validate. If the assumptions 
are inaccurate, then allocating resources based on risk values could lead to poor use of 
resources.   
There are known deficiencies with terrorism risk analysis and TVC models in 
particular, but what else can be done?  Brown et al. (2005), Cox (2008b), NRC (2010) 
and others suggest the use of game theory models as an alternative. We discuss game 
theoretical techniques in Chapter III. 
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III. GAME THEORY 
With proper structuring and careful analysis, game theory can be a powerful tool 
for solving complex real-world problems. Game theory has many applications, but we 
narrow our focus to key concepts used to solve security games of infrastructure defense 
between a defender and an attacker.  
A. BACKGROUND OF GAME THEORY 
1. Basic Concepts 
A game is essentially any situation with the following components (Straffin 2006, 
p. 3): 
1. At least two players. A player may be an individual or general entity such as a 
company, nation, or group. 
2. Each player has a number of possible strategies, each representing a course of 
action that the player may choose. 
3. Strategies chosen by each player determine the outcome of the game. 
4. Each game outcome has a collection of numerical payoffs, one to each player. 
Payoffs represent the value of the game outcome to the different players. 
Some games are influenced by chance and others depend only on the players’ 
actions (Owen 1995, p. 1). The final outcome is determined jointly by the strategies 
chosen by all of the participating players.   
Game theory is a set of concepts aimed at decision making in a competition, 
conflict, or cooperation. Game theory can be thought of as the study of how players 
should rationally play games (Straffin 2006, p. 3).   
We can model many real-world problems as games and use proven mathematical 
concepts to determine the optimal strategy for each player. The applications can range 
from simple parlor games such as poker or chess, to world changing events such as 
political conflict or war.   
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In order to apply game theory, we must first determine:  (1) what type of game is played, 
(2) who the players are, and (3) what their respective payoffs are. 
a. Payoff Matrices 
A game matrix is a common method for representing the payoff structure 
of the game. The size of the matrix is determined by the number of strategies for each 
player. One player’s strategies make up the rows and the other player’s strategies make 
up the columns. The simplest form of a game involves two players. Player 1 chooses a 
(row) strategy ݅	 ∈ ሼ1,2,3, … .ܯሽ and Player 2 chooses (column) strategy ݆	 ∈
ሼ1,2,3, … .ܰሽ. The possible outcomes of the game are then defined by a ܯ ൈܰ size 
payoff matrix P, whose elements ௜ܲ௝ each correspond to a unique combination of 
strategies by the players.  
The payoff matrix in a game is either zero-sum or non-zero-sum. In zero-
sum games, like chess, one player wins the game and the other player loses the game, 
thus players interests are directly opposed to each other.  “A game is zero-sum if and only 
if, at each terminal vertex, the payoff function is equal to zero. Everything that someone 
wins must be lost by someone else” (Owen 1995, p.11).   
Non-zero-sum games generally mean that the players’ payoffs are not 
directly opposed, therefore concepts such as cooperation, threats, agreements, and 
betrayal play a role in the outcome. 
b. Game Play 
One key distinction is whether a game is sequential, where players move 
in turn, or simultaneous, where players move at the same time. We can solve sequential 
games using a “Stackelberg solution” (von Stackelberg, 1948). Simultaneous games can 
be solved by finding the Nash Equilibrium (Straffin 2006, p. 66). 
In general, sequential games are solved by backward induction, using 
calculus to derive the strategy that produces the optimal outcome. We refer to two 
sequential players as the leader and the follower. Stackelberg solutions optimize the 
follower’s decision variable first then use the results to optimize the leader’s decision 
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variable. For zero-sum games, the leader has a mathematical disadvantage. In contrast, in 
non-zero-sum games, the leader may have the advantage. If the assumptions and data of a 
sequential play game are accurate and complete, then the Stackelberg solution will be an 
equilibrium for the game (Basar & Olsder, 1999). 
Simultaneous games can be solved using the “Nash Equilibrium” solution. Each 
player first looks for a dominant strategy, a strategy that always gives him the optimal 
payoff regardless of any strategy chosen by the other players. If a dominant strategy is 
not available, the available strategies may produce a saddle point. A saddle point is an 
equilibrium where neither player can achieve a higher payoff when playing an alternative 
strategy (Owen 1995, p. 12). Saddle points and dominance are considered to be pure 
strategies, where the players have one optimal strategy and always play it. Games that 
don’t have pure strategies have mixed strategies (Owen, 1995, p. 13 and 65). Mixed 
strategies are a set of distinct strategies, where each strategy belonging to the set is played 
with a given probability (Straffin 2006, p. 13). 
In zero-sum games, opposing players desire to keep their strategy secret, however, 
if the players learn the proportion of strategies that make up the opposing player’s mixed 
strategy, the optimal outcome can still be obtained by playing the strategies in random 
order (Owen, 1995). 
Some games are played only once and therefore called single-play games, while 
other games are played again and again. Knowing if the game is a repeated game can 
affect the optimal strategy for a player. 
2. Brief Historical Account 
Jon von Neumann published the fundamental theorem of two-person zero-sum 
games in 1928 (Straffin, 2006). Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern began pioneering 
other game theory concepts, eventually publishing “Theory of Games Economic 
Behavior” in 1944 (Straffin, 2006). Heirnrich Feiherr von Stackelberg, a German 
economist, made important game theory contributions in the 1930s and 1940s by 
modeling leader and follower games, which eventually were termed as sequential games 
(von Stackelberg, 1948). Stackelberg recognized that the leader must account for the 
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follower’s optimal strategy in response to the leader’s actions. Stackelberg’s game theory 
concepts have been used in business and economics over the past 50 years, and recently, 
in the study of security games. 
John Nash, an American mathematician and economist, made significant 
contributions to the study of game theory during the second half of the twentieth century. 
Most notably, Nash determined that all games have at least one equilibrium, a point in the 
game where if all players make rational choices, no player can do better by choosing an 
action that does not belong to the equilibrium. In other words, there is at least one stable 
solution to any game, given that it is set up correctly and assuming all players act 
rationally. 
B. SECURITY PROBLEMS AS GAMES   
1. Basic Setup 
In security games we have two types of players, defenders and attackers. We 
consider two types of security games (1) protection and (2) system interdiction. We 
distinguish these two types of games by the players’ objectives. A protection game is a 
situation where the defender’s objective is to protect an asset, system, resource, or other 
value from possible attacks. A system interdiction game is one in which the defender 
desires to prevent disruptions to a system of operation.   
We present the basic concepts of a security game using the following notional 
example. Consider a simple zero-sum game between an attacker and defender, where the 
defender’s objectives is to protect two assets from possible attacks.   
• Let’s consider two infrastructure assets, A and B. 
• Let ܥ஺ denote the consequence of a ‘successful’ attack on A. Let ܥ஻ 
denote the consequence of a successful attack on B. 
• Assume ܥ஺ ൐ ܥ஻. 
• Assume that an attack on an undefended asset is always successful. 
• Assume an attack on a defended asset always fails. 
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• Assume the defender is limited by resources and can only protect one asset 
at a time. Likewise, the attacker is limited by resources and can only 
launch one attack at time.   
Figure 5 is the game matrix for our notional protection security game. 
 
Figure 5.   Basic Security Example 
2. Simultaneous vs. Sequential Zero Sum Games 
If the game play is sequential as modeled in a Stackelberg game, we observe a 
clear disadvantage to the leader of the game. For instance, if the defender commits the 
first move to defend asset A, the attacker can observe the defenders move and launch an 
attack on asset B. This will result in the defender receiving a payoff of  െ	ܥ஻ and the 
attacker receiving a payoff of  ൅	ܥ஻. In a similar way, if the attacker commits the first 
move by attacking asset A, the defender can choose to defend asset A and both players 
would receive a payoff of zero.   
If the game is simultaneous then both players will look for a dominant strategy, 
saddle point, or optimal mixed strategy. To solve this game, we must determine if the 
game is a single event (such as an investment in infrastructure by the defender) or a 
repeated event (such as conducting a daily security patrol).   
Assuming this game is a single event and no additional information is available, 
the defender may choose a conservative strategy that minimizes the possible 
consequences. In decision theory this strategy is referred to as minimax, where the player 
desires to minimize the maximum possible regret.     
min௜ 	max௝ 	 ௜ܲ௝ 
Defend A  max (0,ܥ஻)  =  ܥ஻ 
Attacker
Attack "A" Attack "B"
Defend "A" 0
Defender Defend "B" 0ܥ஺
ܥ஻
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Defend B  max (ܥ஺,0)  =  ܥ஺ 
Because the defender values ܥ஺ 	൐ 	ܥ஻,  then the defender will choose to defend 
asset A, effectively conceding asset B to attack.   
3. Mixed Strategy 
Assuming this is a repeated game, given the defender plays a pure strategy to 
defend asset A, the attacker would learn over time to always choose to attack B. In order 
to prevent a constant loss of asset B, the defender can choose to play a mixed strategy 
instead of a pure strategy. A repeated protection game can be optimized with a mixed 
strategy and solved using the Nash Equilibrium. A mixed strategy for the defender would 
be to defend asset A, a proportion of time equal to  ஼ಲሺ஼ಲା஼ಳሻ  and then defend asset B a 
proportion of time equal to  ஼ಳሺ஼ಲା஼ಳሻ . Playing a mixed strategy will result in a payoff of 
െ ஼ಲ஼ಳሺ஼ಲା஼ಳሻ for the defender. This is a smaller expected loss than playing the pure strategy 
to always defend A which results in an expected loss of ܥ஻.	Consider the following proof:  
ܥ஺ܥ஻
ሺܥ஺ ൅ ܥ஻ሻ ൏ ܥ஻ 
ܥ஺ܥ஻ ൏ ܥ஻ሺܥ஺ ൅ ܥ஻ሻ 
ܥ஺ܥ஻ ൏ ܥ஺ܥ஻ ൅ ܥ஻ଶ 
0 ൏ ܥ஻ଶ. 
To avoid predictability, each player will randomize his respective strategy when 
playing the probabilities given above. 
4. Non-Zero Sum Games 
In some games, the attackers may not share the same objectives as the defenders 
and therefore have different payoffs. With different payoffs, the game is no longer zero-




(Tambe, Shieh, & An, 2011). In each box, the payoffs on the left side of the comma 
belong to the defender while the payoffs on the right side of the comma belong to the 
attacker.   
 
Figure 6.   Non-Zero Security Example 
For a sequential game play, we observe a stark contrast to the zero-sum game. 
The leader in a non-zero sum game will have an advantage by going first. In this 
example, if the defender only considers his own payoffs, then the defender would always 
choose strategy A because it is a dominant strategy. By choosing strategy A, the defender 
will receive a payoff of 2 because the attacker prefers strategy C to strategy D in this 
case.   If the defender also considers the attacker’s payoffs, then he realizes that by 
playing strategy B he can do better:  the attacker will choose strategy D and the defender 
will receive a payoff of 3. In a non-zero-sum game there is a first-mover (leader) 
advantage, but this advantage relies on the assumption that the adversary’s payoffs are 
known. 
If the game is simultaneous, then defender and attackers will optimize their 
payoffs by solving for the Nash Equilibrium. That Nash equilibrium for this problem is: 
Defender plays strategy A:   2/3 Defender plays strategy B:   1/3 
Attacker play strategy C: 1/2 Attacker plays strategy D: 1/2   
Sampling randomly from these mixed strategies assures each player receives the 
optimal payoff, which for this game is (8/3,2/3). Any player choosing to play something 
other than the mixed strategy equilibrium will realize a reduced expected payoff in the 




Defender B 1,0 3,2
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Non-zero-sum games have become popular for representing security conflict 
because it is generally recognized that terrorists have different objectives than ours 
(Keeney, 2009). Unfortunately, any advantage in problem realism brought by non-zero-
sum payoffs is balanced (and perhaps overwhelmed) by two strong disadvantages. The 
first disadvantage is the assumption of known adversary payoffs. Modeling the payoffs 
for an adversary is as difficult as trying to assess intent (see the discussion in Chapter II), 
and errors in assumed adversary payoffs can lead to poor defense. The second 
disadvantage is that the theory for solving non-zero-sum games often falls short in the 
sense that it does not provide clear guidance on how to solve them. Two famous 
examples are the prisoner’s dilemma (Straffin, 2006, p. 73) and the vacation game 
(Owen, 1995, p. 163) that even in simple forms are problematic for identifying clear 
decision guidance. 
5. Secrecy 
For zero-sum games, each player desires to keep his actions secret from the other 
player. For sequential games, the follower will lose the advantage if he is unable to 
determine the leader’s move. If the follower cannot see the leader’s action, then the game 
can be played as a simultaneous game. In practice, the leader in a security game will 
generally attempt to keep actions secret to achieve a higher payoff.  
Players often make significant efforts to learn information about the moves or 
intended moves of the other players. Both players use available means to learn 
information through intelligence gathering, observation, and modeling. If correct 
information is learned, a player can achieve a payoff greater than what is achieved 
through a Nash Equilibrium.    
C. RANDOMIZED PATROLLING 
Another application of game theory to infrastructure defense is the randomization 
of security patrols. Consider the situation where a defender conducts security patrols to 
locate, stop, and/or deter attackers. A predictable security patrol creates a vulnerability to 
the system being defended. Attackers that observe predictable patrols can determine area 
of coverage and the time periods of that coverage. Armed with this information, attackers 
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can accurately determine what gaps exist in the security, and then exploit those gaps. If 
the defender’s actions appear random, the attacker can’t determine security gaps with the 
same high level of certainty.   
1. Framework for Randomizing Security Patrols 
One way to model security patrols is to use the Stackelberg Equilibrium which 
assumes the defender will choose an optimal strategy based on the assumption that the 
attacker will observe this strategy and choose an optimal response (Tambe, Shieh, & An, 
2011). Researchers at the University of Southern California (USC) have developed an 
algorithm named Decomposed Optimal Bayesian Stackelberg Solver (DOBSS) to solve 
mixed integer linear programs to randomize scheduling, and optimize the time and 
location of security patrols.   
2. Currently Used Randomization Models   
The Los Angeles Airport (LAX) security forces face the challenge of patrolling an 
expansive area with limited number of personnel to stop and deter acts of terrorism. 
Researchers at the USC developed a game theory model called Assistant for Randomized 
Monitoring of Routes (ARMOR) to optimize the feasible defender actions by 
randomizing the security patrol schedules (Tambe, Shieh, & An, 2011).   
Intelligent Randomization in Scheduling (IRIS) was also created at USC for the 
Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS). There are approximately 29,000 commercial 
flights each day (Teamcore, 2011). FAMS does not have enough man-power to cover all 
those flights, so they must prioritize limited resources to provide the best coverage 
possible. FAMS utilizes the DHS risk based assessment to prioritize flights then uses 
IRIS to provide the appearance of randomization to the observing attacker. 
Similarly, the Coast Guard is trying to solve the same problem with the Ports, 
Waterways, and Coastal Security (PWCS) mission by developing a scheduling tool called 
Port Resilience Operational / Tactical Enforcement to Combat Terrorism (PROTECT) 
(Tambe, Shieh, & An, 2011). PROTECT is being reviewed as a possible solution to 
scheduling Coast Guard air and sea resources across multiple mission requirements 
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(Tambe, Shieh, & An, 2011). These models provide a randomized strategy for the 
defender that is more difficult for a terrorist to predict.   
D. SYSTEM INTERDICTION MODELS 
Another application of game theory in the context of infrastructure defense has 
been the study of system interdiction problems. Researchers at the Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS) have developed a mathematical technique with a wide range of 
applications that focuses on system resiliency given any possible attack or combinations 
of attacks (Brown et al., 2005). Resiliency is the “ability to resist, absorb, recover from or 
successfully adapt to adversity or change in conditions” (DHS, 2010).   
1. Framework for System Interdiction 
In this thesis, a system is a collection of individual components that work together 
to achieve a particular function, governed by domain-specific physics, protocols, 
operating rules, etc. The interactions of components are often non-additive and non-
intuitive. The system operator makes decisions about the activities that take place in a 
system. These decisions are typically limited by finite resources, component 
interdependence, or other constraints (i.e., what is feasible). We can evaluate the system 
performance that results from these choices. The objective states what the decision maker 
is trying to get the system to do. 
2. System Interdiction Models 
Dixon (2011) presents the following progression of system interdiction models for 
infrastructure defense. 
a. Isolated Operations Model 
We start by modeling infrastructure in isolation to assess our basic system 
operation. This model allows us to capture accurate operational details of the system. A 
system operator is presented with various decisions to run his system. The system 
operator decision variables are represented by y which belongs to a set of all possible 
decisions Y, which are limited by the system’s constraints. Under normal operations there 
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is a set of known conditions ݔ௢ that the system runs within. Thus, ݔ௢ represents a single 
scenario of normal operating conditions. Without loss of generality, we assume that 
operators want to run the system at a minimum cost. Costs can be measured monetarily or 
by other key resources such as manpower or other commodity according to a function 
݂ሺݕ, ݔ଴ሻ. We formulate an “Operator Model” system under normal conditions as: 
min୷	∈	ଢ଼ 	fሺy, ݔ௢ሻ. 
b. Systems with Multiple Scenarios 
Many systems experience more than one set of operating conditions. 
Operators often adjust the decision variable y for different scenarios. Simple examples of 
this type of adjustment are the use of different staff sizes from weekdays to weekends or 
following different routes during rush hour and at midnight. The mathematics to solve 
this type of system are the same as our normal operations problem, where for a given 
scenario ̅ݔ, we solve: 
min୷	∈	ଢ଼ 	fሺy, ̅ݔሻ. 
With the operator’s model, we can systematically solve for the best 
activities y under each scenario ̅ݔ of interest. 
c. Systems with Non-Deliberate Hazards 
Some systems experience random disruptions. Random disruptions can be 
accounted for in our set of conditions x. We can think of random disruptions as non-
deliberate attacks. A simple example of this type of disruption might be a waterway 
blockage due to hurricane damage or a transportation asset experiencing a mechanical 
failure. We can represent random changes to our normal conditions as a random variable 
ݔ෤ and we can simulate values for ݔ෤ by using Monte Carlo techniques and statistical 
analysis, given data of historical hazards. Here, the operator is represented as the 
defender and the hazard is represented as the attacker. In the presence of non-deliberate 
hazards, the operator might choose activities according to: 
min	୷	∈ଢ଼ ܧ௫෤ሼ	fሺy, ݔ෤	ሻሽ 
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or some other measure of performance for this uncertain system. 
d. Systems with Deliberate Attacks 
In the case of an attacker who deliberately attempts to disrupt the system, 
we have a two-stage, zero-sum game. The deliberate attack is no longer a random 
variable, but instead becomes a decision variable x. The attacker is also limited in 
resources and capabilities, therefore the decision variable x must belong to a feasible set 
X, which represents the constraints on the attacker. The system operator’s objective 
remains to run the system at a minimum cost. The attacker’s objective is to cause the 
maximum disruption to the system. We represent this game as an attacker-defender (AD) 
model (Brown et al., 2005) of the following form: 
max୶∈ଡ଼ 	min୷∈	ଢ଼ 	fሺy, xሻ. 
e. Investment to Reduce Attack  
If the defender can invest resources that reduce the attacker’s capabilities 
to disrupt the system, the defender is making the first move and the attacker becomes the 
follower. For any system investment ݓഥ  that reduces the attacker’s capabilities in the set 
X, the worst-case disruption to the system is again solved by: 
max௫∈௑ሺ௪ഥሻ	min௬∈௒ ݂ሺݕ, ݔ, ݓഥሻ 
Where ܺሺݓഥሻ is the new feasible set of attacks for the attacker given 
investments ݓഥ, and the function f also reflects this defensive investment. 
f. Defender Attacker Defender (DAD) 
In general, the amount of resources the defender can invest to make the 
system more resilient to attack is also limited. The defender wants to optimize the 
investment of resources to build system resiliency. Our investment w now becomes a 
decision variable of the defender. We represent investment constraints by saying that w is 
an element of the set W of possible resource investments. We assume the attacker acts to 
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cause maximum disruption. Our system interdiction model is now a defender-attacker-
defender (DAD) problem of the following form (Alderson et al. 2011): 
min௪∈ௐ		 max௫∈௑ሺ௪ሻ		 min௬∈௒ ݂ሺݕ, ݔ, ݓሻ. 
E. GAME THEORY AND PORTS, WATERWAYS, AND COASTAL 
SECURITY (PWCS) 
Under the PWCS mission area, the Coast Guard plays the role of the defender 
when protecting the maritime transportation system and CI/KR. In this situation, the 
attacker could be either natural hazards and/or deliberate attackers such as terrorists. 
These two different types of attackers have different payoffs and decision processes. 
Natural hazards act randomly regardless of the decisions the defender makes. The 
terrorist is an intelligent adversary who acts deliberately, considers the defender’s 
actions, and uses timing and conditions that will optimize the attack.   
Using system interdiction models to analyze the PWCS mission requires an 
understanding of how a system operates. Our use of mathematical optimization (1) 
identifies the attacker’s strategies that maximize system disruption and (2) identifies the 
defender’s actions that minimize those consequences. In other words, it will determine 
the worse-case scenario for the defender, pointing the defender in the right direction for 
applying resources to maintain system operation regardless of what action the attacker 
takes. We look at a system interdiction model for the PWCS mission in Chapter IV. 
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IV. SYSTEM INTERDICTION MODEL FOR THE TRANSPORT 
OF COAL IN THE PITTSBURGH THREE RIVERS AREA 
A. DEFINING THE PROBLEM 
Pittsburgh is one of the major industrial cities of the United States. Commodities 
can travel in and out of Pittsburgh by highway, rail, and waterway. Pittsburgh is uniquely 
located at the convergence of the Ohio, the Allegheny, and the Monongahela Rivers, 
known collectively as the Three Rivers. These rivers connect to three of the four largest 
coal mining states in the U.S.: Kentucky, West Virginia, and Pennsylvania. Currently, 
Pittsburgh is the second-largest inland port and the 20th largest overall port in the United 
States (Port of Pittsburgh Commission, 2011). Figure 7 shows Pittsburgh’s connection to 
the inland waterways of United States.  
 
Figure 7.   Inland Waterway System (From: Port of Pittsburgh) 
There is $9 billion of commerce flow through the Port of Pittsburgh annually. 
Coal comprises 76% of the total commerce flow through Pittsburgh, making it by far the 
most influential commodity in that area (Port of Pittsburgh Commission, 2011). 
Nationally, coal is used to provide power to run approximately half of the U.S. electrical 
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power grid. Coal can be categorized into two types, lignite and coke. Coke coal is a 
primary resource for the production of steel. Pittsburgh currently produces 25% of the 
steel used in the United States. Lignite coal is used to provide power for production in 
factories and power to the U.S. electrical grid. Given this, coal is a key resource and 
primary driver of the commerce flow along the Three Rivers. 
“USCG missions and actions foster economic prosperity and national security by 
ensuring that the marine transportation system supplying food, energy, raw materials, 
consumer goods and technology is safe, secure, and reliable” (USCG, 2011d). The 
Marine Transportation System (MTS) includes all coastal areas and the Inland Waterway 
System (IWS). Under the Department of Homeland Security, the USCG is also charged 
with protecting critical infrastructure and key resources from possible terrorist attacks. 
Specifically, through the PWCS mission, the Coast Guard must ensure the continuous 
flow of commerce along the MTS. To do this, the USCG must allocate its limited 
resources to provide optimal protection from potential terrorist attacks. Therefore, the 
USCG needs to understand the resilience of the system that moves coal through the Port 
of Pittsburgh along the Three Rivers. 
B. DEFINING THE SYSTEM 
The cost to move a ton of coal one mile by barge is $.005, by railway the cost is 
$.05, and by truck the cost is $.10 (Port of Pittsburgh Commission, 2011). A typical 
shipment of coal consists of fifteen jumbo barges carrying 1,750 tons of coal each, 
yielding 26,250 tons total per shipment. In contrast, one truck and trailer can haul 
approximately 25 tons. It would take about 1,050 trucks to transport the same quantity of 
coal as just one barge shipment. One jumbo hopper rail car can carry approximately 110 
tons. It would take 216 rail cars to carry the same as amount as one barge shipment of 
coal. The waterways are therefore the most efficient and economical mode of 
transportation. Figure 8 shows the relative comparison of coal transport capacities. 
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Figure 8.   Mode of Transport Comparison (From: Port of Pittsburgh) 
Pittsburgh has infrastructure in place to move coal by all three modes of transport, 
however, under normal operation coal is transported by barge along the waterways. If 
something were to disrupt the normal flow, contingencies are in place to move coal by 
rail, but there are constraints of crane offloading capacities and increased costs. 
Movement by truck is cost prohibitive, so we restrict attention to waterways and railways 
for our system model. 
We build a network to model the movement of coal. We identify supply and 
demand locations, choke points and transfer locations, which we represent by nodes. We 
use arcs between nodes to indicate the pathways that coal can follow. We include both 
waterway arcs and railway arcs to move coal from its supply nodes to the demand nodes. 
We scope our network geographically to approximately a 15 mile radius from the 
Port of Pittsburgh (convergence point of the Three Rivers). The first lock and dam system 
along each river from the Point of Pittsburgh make up the network boundaries. Figure 9 
depicts the geographical area that is assessed in our problem. We use a time period of one 
week to determine the capacities and costs. 
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Figure 9.   Geographic depiction of model (From: Google Earth) 
The objective of the coal transport network problem is to minimize the overall 
cost, even in the presence of disruptions. To solve this problem, we use a min-cost 
network flow model. 
C. MATHEMATICAL REPRESENTATION 
1. Defender Problem (D) 
The first step in solving a min-cost network flow problem is to define a network 
that represents the defender’s objective. In our network, the defender’s objective is to 
minimize the cost required to transport the total flow of coal from the supply nodes to the 
demand nodes. The model is subject to balance of flow constraints and a maximum 
capacity of flow along each arc. 
Let ܩ ൌ ሺܰ, ܣሻ represent a directed graph, where N is a set of nodes and 




݊	 ∈ ܰ   Nodes in the system (alias i, j) 
ሺ݅, ݆ሻ ∈ ܣ  Directed arcs  
 
Data 
ܥ௜௝   Cost per-unit of operating arc ሺ݅, ݆ሻ ∈ ܣ  [$/ton] 
ݑ௜௝   Capacity of arc ሺ݅, ݆ሻ ∈ ܣ    [tons] 
݌݈݁݊ܽݐݕ௡  Penalty for unmet demand at node n   [$/ton] 
݈௡   Supply at node n when ݈௡ ൐ 0   [tons] 
   ሺെ Demand) at node n when ݈௡ ൏ 0   [tons] 
 
Decision Variables 
ݕ௜௝    Flow on arc ሺ݅, ݆ሻ    [$/ton] 
Elastic Variables 
ݑ݊݉݁ݐ. ݀݁݉ܽ݊݀௡  Commodity not reaching demand at node n [tons] 
ݑ݊݉݁ݐ. ݏݑ݌݌݈ݕ௡  Commodity not leaving supply at node n [tons]  
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Formulation 1:  Defender Model  (D) 
min௬ 				 ෍ ܥ௜௝ݕ௜௝ሺ௜,௝ሻ∈஺
	൅෍ሺ݌݈݁݊ܽݐݕ௝
௝∈ே






ൌ 	 ௝݈ െ 	ݑ݊݉݁ݐ. ݀݁݉ܽ݊ ௝݀ 	൅ ݑ݊݉݁ݐ. ݏݑ݌݌݈ݕ௝		∀݆ ∈ ܰ					ሺD1ሻ	 
ݕ௜௝ 	൑ ݑ௜௝																																		∀ሺ݅, ݆ሻ ∈ ܣ      (D2) 
ݕ௜௝ 	൒ 0																																					∀ሺ݅, ݆ሻ ∈ ܣ      (D3) 
ݑ݊݉݁ݐ. ݀݁݉ܽ݊ ௝݀ ൒ 0											∀	݆							           (D4) 
ݑ݊݉݁ݐ. ݏݑ݌݌݈ݕ௝ ൒ 0														∀	݆							       (D5) 
The objective (D0) calculates the flow cost. The decision variable ݕ௜௝ represents a 
movement of coal. A penalty cost is added for any demands not met. The balance of flow 
constraint (D1) assures mathematical feasibility and assigns supply and demands to the 
nodes. We restrict the flow ݕ௜௝ to the maximum arc capacity ݑ௜௝ in constraint (D2). 
Equation (D3) is a non-negativity constraint on the decision variable and equations (D4) 
and (D5) are the non-negativity constraints for the elastic variables.    
2. Attacker Defender (AD) 
We consider an intelligent attacker with an objective to disrupt the system. We 
assume that the defender’s system will operate optimally when undisrupted. The attacker 
makes a decision as to which arc to attack to cause a maximum disruption. We assume 
the attacker is constrained in how many simultaneous attacks can be made.   
To model an arc disruption we create a penalty that is an artificial value greater 
than the cost of any possible path through the network. The penalty ensures that the 
operator will take a shortfall only when no feasible path exists, but the penalty has no 
actual meaning in cost to the problem. We represent a penalty for disruption as: 
ݍ௜௝ ൌ ݊ ൈ maxሺ௜,௝ሻ∈஺൛ܥ௜௝ൟ. 
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To model the Attacker-Defender problem we include the following data and 
decision variables. 
Data 
ݍ௜௝   Penalty imposed on attacked arc   [$/ton] 
num.attacks  Number of allowable attacks    [parameter] 
Decision Variable 
ݔ௜௝   Disrupt flow on arc ሺ݅, ݆ሻ    [binary] 
 
Formulation 2:  Attacker-Defender Model  (AD) 
 
max௫ 		min௬ 	 ෍ ሺܥ௜௝ ൅ ݔ௜௝ݍ௜௝ሻݕ௜௝ሺ௜,௝ሻ∈஺
	൅		෍ሺ݌݈݁݊ܽݐݕ௝
௝∈ே






ൌ 	 ௝݈ െ	ݑ݊݉݁ݐ. ݀݁݉ܽ݊ ௝݀ 	൅ ݑ݊݉݁ݐ. ݏݑ݌݌݈ݕ௝				∀	݆ ∈ ܰ			ሺܣܦ1ሻ 
ݕ௜௝ 	൑ ݑ௜௝														∀ሺ݅, ݆ሻ ∈ ܣ																																																																																																			ሺܣܦ2ሻ 
ݕ௜௝ 	൒ 0																	∀ሺ݅, ݆ሻ ∈ ܣ																																																																																																			ሺܣܦ3ሻ 
෍ ݔ௜௝ ൑ 2ሺ݊ݑ݉. ܽݐݐܽܿ݇ݏሻ																																																																																																ሺܣܦ4ሻ
ሺ௜,௝ሻ∈஺
 
ݔ௜௝ ൌ ݔ௝௜																∀ሺ݅, ݆ሻ ∈ ܣ																																																																																																			ሺܣܦ5ሻ 
ݔ௜௝ ∈ ሼ0,1ሽ												∀ሺ݅, ݆ሻ ∈ ܣ																																																																																																			ሺܣܦ6ሻ 
By adding the attacker to the defender’s problem (D), the formulation (AD) 
becomes a two-stage optimization problem. Our objective (AD0) introduces an additional 
penalty induced by the attacker’s decision to disrupt arc ݔ௜௝. Constraint (AD1) is the same 
balance of flow as in problem (D). Equation (AD2) and (AD3) restricts the defender’s 
flow from zero to the maximum capacity of each arc. We restrict the number of allowable 
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attacks in equation (AD4). Equation (AD5) indicates that an attack on a directed arc will 
also disrupt the flow in the opposite direction on the attacked arc. Equation (AD6) 
constrains the attack to a binary variable, where ݔ௜௝ ൌ 1 on an attacked arc and ݔ௜௝ ൌ 0 
for arcs with no attacks. 
The network model consists of 25 nodes and 70 directed arcs. Overall there are 
two net supply nodes and three net demand nodes. Eight of the nodes represent the 
railways and 17 nodes make up the waterways. Of the arcs, nine are railway arcs, eight 
are terminal offload arcs, and eighteen are river arcs. See Appendix B for details of nodes, 
arcs, and data used in this model. We determine the cost of each arc by a function of 
distance and a ratio of dollars per ton for each mode of transport. The capacities are 
formed by flow limitations on each arc and by loading limitations at the transfer stations.   
Figure 10 shows the resulting representation of the coal transport system.   
 
Figure 10.   Representation of coal transport system. Arcs are labeled as (Cost, 
Capacity). Supply nodes are depicted with a negative tonnage ( K-tons per week 
and demand nodes are depicted with positive K-tons per week.   
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D. RESULTS 
1. General Results 
Under normal operations, the coal supply flows from the Monongahela River and 
the Ohio River through the river arcs to the demand terminal nodes of GTC and GTS. 
The remainder of the coal supply continues along the waterway arcs to the net demand 
node, ALLE, which represents demands of terminals upriver along the Allegheny River. 
We assume a shortfall penalty ݍ௜௝ for each node that fails to meet the desired demand.    
The base cost for normal operations is $452K and there are no shortfalls in demand. 
Figure 11 shows the results of the system under normal conditions. The highlighted arcs 
indicate the optimal pathway for coal movement.   
 
Figure 11.   Normal Flow Coal Transport Network 
We next introduce disruptions to the system. We begin by limiting the attacker to 
one attack, then step-by-step increase the number of simultaneous attacks allowed. For 
any value of num.attacks, we find the most critical arcs being attacked. We find the 
second most critical arc to attack by removing the most critical arc from the set of 
feasible attacks. 
By allowing the attacker to make a single attack (num.attacks = 1), we observe 
that the maximum disruption from a single attack occurs at the arc between the Point of 
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Pittsburgh (PTPT) and the Allegheny Transfer node (ALLT). The loss of this most 
critical single arc doubles the normal operations cost to a value of $1026K. A disruption 
on this arc forces the coal supply to ALLE to use railroad arcs to meet demand, as seen in 
Figure 12. The second worst single arc attack is between the Monongahela River Transfer 
(MONT) to PTPT. The cost of the second most critical arc is $1022K. Figure 12 shows 
the resulting costs of the most critical single attacks.  
 
Figure 12.   Single-arc attacks. Left: worst single-arc attack. Right:  second worst 
single arc attack.  
Figure 13 shows the effects from the nine most significant single-arc attacks. 
Only the first two result in costs significantly above normal operations.   
 
Figure 13.   Operating costs resulting from single-arc attacks on system 
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Figure 14.   Left: Worst two-arc attack – Right: Worst three-arc attack 
 
Figure 15.   Left: Worst four-arc attack 
We next examine the system given the attacker can launch two, three, and four 
simultaneous disruptions. Figures 14–15 show the results from these most critical attack 
sets. 
When num.attacks =2, the worst case disruption increases the cost to $1026K, the 
same as a single attack to the most critical arc. This is because the redundancy of the 
railroad infrastructure in the study area prevents further cost increases from a second arc 
attack to the system. 
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When num.attacks = 3, the attacker is capable of shutting off flow through the 
Braddock Lock and Dam system on the Monongahela River. This forces the flow of coal 
to travel on longer, and hence more costly, railway routes, resulting in system cost of 
$1934K.   
When num.attacks = 4, the demands are no longer met on the Allegheny River. 
Because of the penalty imposed for shortfalls, the cost to the system becomes an artificial 
value of $25,838K, which indicates the problem is infeasible. Note, however, that this 
four-arc attack interdicts three separate railroad arcs to ALLE in order to create the 
shortfall. In practice, each of these railroad arcs is really a network of possible rail routes, 
which have considerable redundancy and would likely be much harder to disrupt. As long 
as one of these rail routes remains available, then this artificial cost of $25,838K drops to 
a more realistic $2,337K. 
Our system interdiction model for the transportation of coal through the Port of 
Pittsburgh produces some insightful results. In general we are able to determine the most 
critical pathways for minimizing the transport of coal. We are able to determine where an 
adversary can cause the greatest damage. The most notable results from our study show 
that one attack at a critical location along the waterway could double the cost of total coal 
movement. Four simultaneous attacks to the system stops demand from being met on the 
Allegheny River, resulting in a significant economic impact to the system. By protecting 
the three waterway arcs between ALLT and ALLE, USCG could ensure system 
feasibility and prevent significant economic impact to the system.   
2. Future Study 
This preliminary analysis made the following assumptions:  
(1) We consider only a single commodity, namely coal, and we assume the flow 
in and out of the study area is a net supply or demand. We also assume only 
one type of coal is being transported. There are two distinct types of coal 
(lignite and coke) which will have distinct supply and demand locations. A 
more thorough analysis would consider multiple commodities to more 
accurately track the total flow of each type of coal.  
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(2)  We used a time period of one week for our model. We assume an attack on 
any one arc in our network would cause a minimum of a seven-day disruption. 
Modeling this problem for longer durations would introduce diversity in the 
length of time a specific arc would be removed from the system, depending on 
the infrastructure and method of attack. For example, we expect that a lock 
and dam would take longer to repair than a blocked waterway.   
(3) It is clear that cost of transporting coal by rail is greater than the cost of 
transporting by waterway, however, these exact costs could vary from location 
to location. A more detailed economic analysis of the transport systems may 
provide additional insight to this problem.  
(4) We abstracted the movement of coal by rail to single direct arcs. In practice, 
there is a separate railroad network for moving coal that could produce 
different insights into the locations of critical nodes and/or arcs. 
(5) The geographic boundaries used for this model included waterways and rail 
within approximately 15 miles from the Port of Pittsburgh. The waterways 
were evaluated from the Port of Pittsburgh to the first lock and dam system on 
each of the three rivers. There are many supply and demand locations on the 
rivers that are located outside the study area. 
Further study for this project should entail analyzing the system under multiple 
time frames such as a month and a year, and broadening the geographical scope of the 
network to include other supply and demand locations.    
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis explores various analytic techniques for guiding defense of the United 
States from acts of terrorism, with specific emphasis on the United States Coast Guard’s 
role in this mission. We conclude by summarizing our work and proposing ideas for 
future study. 
A. SUMMARY 
Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) techniques originated with the insurance field 
in the late 1600s. Since that time, risk-based methods and models have been used in a 
variety of contexts including engineering, organizational safety programs, and recently in 
defense against terrorism.   
Risk is frequently represented in terms of the likelihood that a negative outcome 
will be realized. Determining the likelihood of an event presents many challenges when 
applied to real life problems. Sampling historical data from domestic and international 
incidents can provide insight on frequency of events and lead to more confident 
probabilities of future events, provided that past events are representative of an uncertain 
future. When historical data is limited or not available, probability assessments rely on 
subjective opinions, which can be difficult to validate and can lead to poor assessments of 
the real problem. In the case of terrorism, historical data is significantly limited. 
Terrorism risk is typically quantified by a function of threat, vulnerability, and 
consequence assessments. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the USCG, and 
others use TVC (ݐ݄ݎ݁ܽݐ ൈ ݒݑ݈݊݁ݎܾ݈ܽ݅݅ݐݕ ൈ ܿ݋݊ݏ݁ݍݑ݁݊ܿ݁ሻ models to quantify risk. 
There are significant philosophical, practical, and mathematical concerns with this view 
of terrorism risk.    
Risk-based techniques for terrorism typically model terrorists as random 
variables. An intelligent adversary can adapt strategy, learn from past events, and use 
timing and current events to optimize an attack. Therefore, an intelligent adversary does 
not act randomly; this produces different results than a random attacker. 
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Terrorism risk quantified by TVC assumes independence of threat, vulnerability, 
and consequence assessments, or sequential dependence. Threat is commonly determined 
by the intention and capabilities of an attacker. In practice, we face many possible 
attackers, some known and some unknown, and this makes it difficult or impossible to 
assess comprehensively their intentions and capabilities. To quantify a threat value, we 
must consider a target’s vulnerability and consequence values. This logic indicates that 
threat assessments depend on vulnerability and consequence assessments. TVC 
calculations can vary considerably from assessments that account for correlation. 
Terrorism risk also assumes the attacker only knows what the defender knows and 
that the attacker’s decision process is the same as the defender’s. We can see clear 
examples in Chapter II where these assumptions can be incorrect and lead to 
mismanagement of risks. 
Game theoretic techniques are a suggested alternative to PRA in the defense 
against an intelligent attacker. If a problem is properly structured and carefully assessed, 
game theory can be used to solve security games of infrastructure defense between a 
defender and an attacker. We study the use of game theory for protection and 
infrastructure defense. We review protection models currently in use by the Federal Air 
Marshal Service, LAX security forces, and the USCG that optimize the location and time 
periods that security forces are implemented.   
In contrast to PRA techniques, such as TVC models, system interdiction models 
do not rely on subjective analysis of potential attackers. System interdiction models focus 
on the analysis of how the system functions and how to make that system more resilient 
in the presence of potential attacks. For systems with unambiguous measures of 
performance, system interdiction models provide decision makers with clear guidance for 
resource allocation, where risk-based models may distance the decision maker from 
solving the real problem.   
We build a system interdiction model to analyze a relevant and current 
infrastructure defense problem along the western rivers of the Inland Waterway System 
(IWS). We identify the Port of Pittsburgh as a critical inland port, with coal as a key 
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resource that is transported along the inland waterways. Our preliminary system 
interdiction model provides insight on the resilience of the transportation of coal through 
the Port of Pittsburgh. With further study, the model can provide guidance on resource 
allocation, such as infrastructure investments, and for the USCG in the Ports, Waterways, 
and Coastal Security (PWCS) mission. 
B. FUTURE WORK 
1. Model Refinements 
This thesis made several simplifying assumptions in the Three Rivers coal 
transport problem. We consider only one type of coal and assume flows are driven by net 
demands, making our model a single commodity minimum cost flow problem. However, 
the costs and penalties for disruptions may vary with the actual type of coal being 
transported, and this can greatly impact the overall cost and identification of what is most 
critical. A natural next step is to build a multi-commodity model that accounts for 
different coal types and multiple intertwined supply and demand networks.   
We assume simplified transport costs of each mode of transport based on general 
data obtained from the Port of Pittsburgh Commission. Actual costs can depend on local 
businesses, current environmental conditions, and other influences. A more detailed 
economic analysis of transport costs and penalties for unmet demands will help validate 
the model’s results.  
Our model uses a time period of one week to capture normal business operations, 
with the assumption that a notable disruption to the system would last a minimum of one 
week. To provide more guidance to decision makers, we should model other time periods 
to include assessments of one month and one year. The study of additional time periods 
may produce results that are different then the results discussed in Chapter IV. 
2. Expanding the Model’s Geographic Area of Study 
We model the waterways and railways systems between the Emsworth Lock and 
Dam on the Ohio River, the Braddock Lock and Dam on the Monongahela Rivers, and 
the Lock and Dam Two on the Allegheny River. This model does not include analysis of 
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many key supply and demand locations located outside the first set of lock and dam 
systems on each river. Expanding the geographical scope will account for these other 
significant influences on the system. The USCG suggests expanding the area of study to 
include Dashields Lock and Dam on the Ohio River, Lock and Dam Three on the 
Monongahela River, and Lock and Dam Three on the Allegheny River. The expanded 
boundaries include additional coal terminals and factories not assessed in the preliminary 
analysis. 
3. Determining the Most Useful Scope of Modeling Inland Waterways 
Creating system interdiction models can be labor intensive. Modeling system 
interdiction requires a thorough understanding of the system and a reasonably accurate 
assessment of system performance. In contrast, models in general that are built with 
excessive intricacies and complexities tend to produce results that either mask the actual 
influences or do not give the decision maker useful guidance. 
To use system interdiction modeling for analysis of the entire IWS, the USCG 
faces a challenging problem of striking the right balance of modeling the system with 
enough detail to be accurate but without such complexity that the model does not provide 
useful results. Future study for determining the proper scope of system interdiction 
modeling of the inland waterways may consider two distinctly different approaches.   
One approach may be to assess the entire IWS using a single-commodity 
minimum cost flow model that focuses only on big picture influences. Various 
commodities may be grouped together into one super commodity that accounts for all 
major commerce flow. A model of this type may be useful for longer term organizational 
strategic planning.    
A second approach would be to build multi-commodity minimum cost flow 
models that are geographically restricted to specified regions such as our Three Rivers 
coal transport model. A regional model would include more details with results that 
would be useful to local operators such as Coast Guard Marine Safety Units and Coast 
Guard Sector commands. 
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4. The Coast Guard’s PWCS Mission 
The Coast Guard’s PWCS mission entails the protection of the U.S. Maritime 
Domain and the Marine Transportation System and those who live, work or recreate near 
them. The Department of Homeland Security has directed the USCG to treat the PWCS 
as its primary mission alongside Search and Rescue. The USCG has limited resources 
available. Currently the USCG uses a form of PRA as a decision tool in allocation of 
resources towards the PWCS mission. This thesis reviews many concerns of risk-based 
approaches to terrorism analysis and specifically TVC models such as the one the USCG 
uses.   
We recommend that future studies be conducted to help chart a course for the 
development and validation of decision support tools. In this thesis we discuss the use of 
game theory and its applications to the Coast Guard’s PWCS mission, as an alternative to 
risk based models. Additional studies of game theory approaches such as system 
interdiction may provide a “navigational chart” that gives the USCG key insight and 
guidance in resource allocation.  
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APPENDIX A 
Definitions used by the Department of Homeland Security 
 
Adversary:  Individual, group, organization, or government that conducts or has 
the intent to conduct detrimental activities. 
Consequence:  Effect of an event, incident, or occurrence. Measured by human, 
economic, mission, environmental, and psychological impacts. 
Likelihood:  Estimate of the potential of an incident or event’s occurrence.  
Used interchangeably with probability. 
Probability:  Likelihood that is expressed as a number between 0 and 1.   
Resilience:  Ability to resist, absorb, recover from or successfully adapt to 
adversity or change in conditions. 
Risk:  Potential for an unwanted outcome resulting from an incident, event, or 
occurrence, as determined by its likelihood and associated consequences. 
Scenario:  Hypothetical situation comprised of a hazard, an entity impacted by 
that hazard, and associated conditions including consequences when appropriate. 
Threat:  Natural or man-made occurrence, individual, entity, or action that has or 
indicates the potential to harm life, information, operations, the environment and/or 
property. Intentional hazard is generally estimated as the likelihood of an attack that 
accounts for the intent and capability of the adversary, being attempted by an adversary. 
Vulnerability:  Physical feature or operational attribute that renders an entity 
open to exploitation or susceptible to a given hazard.. Characteristic of design, location, 
security posture, operation, or any combination thereof, that renders an asset, system, 
network, or entity susceptible to disruption, destruction, or exploitation. 
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APPENDIX B 
The case study in Chapter IV uses the following node data on page B.1 and arc 
data on page B.2. 
Node Name 
Supply / Demand  
(K-tons/week) 
ALLE Allegheny River  20.8 
ALLT Allegheny River Transfer Station 0 
AZCN Terminal 0 
BCBT Terminal 0 
BLA1 Braddock Lock Auxiliary 1 0 
BLA2 Braddock Lock Auxiliary 2 0 
BLM1 Braddock Lock Main 1 0 
BLM2 Braddock Lock Main 2 0 
ELA1 Emsworth Lock Auxiliary 1 0 
ELA2 Emsworth Lock Auxiliary 2 0 
ELM1 Emsworth Lock Main 1 0 
ELM2 Emsworth Lock Main 2 0 
GTC Coal Terminal 14.4 
GTS1 Coal Terminal 10.5 
JS Terminal 0 
LD21 Lock and Dam (2) on Allegheny River 1 0 
LD22 Lock and Dam (2) on Allegheny River 2 0 
MON Monongahela River -35 
MONT Monongahela River Transfer Station 0 
MRIE Terminal 0 
NISI Terminal 0 
OHIO Ohio River -10.7 
OHT Ohio River Transfer Station 0 
PTPT Point of Pittsburgh 0 




StartNode EndNode Capacity  (k-tons/week) Cost 
ALLE LD21 4536 1 
ALLE MONT 81.7 47.75 
ALLE ALLT 81.7 2.5 
ALLE OHT 81.7 35 
ALLT MON 81.7 47.75 
ALLT PTPT 4536 7 
ALLT AZCN 19.2 1 
ALLT ALLE 81.7 2.5 
ALLT LD22 4536 1 
ALLT OHIO 81.7 35 
AZCN ALLT 81.7 0 
BCBT MONT 0 0 
BLA1 BLA2 336 0 
BLA1 MON 4536 0 
BLA2 MONT 4536 1 
BLA2 BLA1 336 0 
BLM1 BLM2 1134 0 
BLM1 MON 4536 0 
BLM2 MONT 4536 1 
BLM2 BLM1 1134 0 
ELA1 ELA2 336 0 
ELA1 OHIO 4536 0 
ELA2 OHT 4536 0 
ELA2 ELA1 336 0 
ELM1 ELM2 1134 0 
ELM1 OHIO 4536 0 
ELM2 OHT 4536 0 
ELM2 ELM1 1134 0 
GTC MONT 19.2 0 
GTS1 OHT 19.2 0 
JS MONT 0 0 
LD21 LD22 336 0 
LD21 ALLE 4536 0 
LD22 ALLT 4536 1 
LD22 LD21 1134 0 
MON BLM1 4536 0 
MON BLA1 4536 0 




StartNode EndNode Capacity  (k-tons/week) Cost 
MON MONT 81.7 2.5 
MONT JS 0 0 
MONT GTC 19.2 0 
MONT BCBT 0 0 
MONT TURR 0 0 
MONT PTPT 4536 12.1 
MONT MON 81.7 2.5 
MONT BLM2 4536 1 
MONT BLA2 4536 1 
MONT ALLE 81.7 47.75 
MONT OHIO 81.7 46.25 
MRIE OHT 0 0 
NISI OHT 0 0 
OHIO ELM1 4536 0 
OHIO ELA1 4536 0 
OHIO MONT 81.7 46.25 
OHIO OHT 81.7 0 
OHIO ALLT 81.7 35 
OHT MON 81.7 46.25 
OHT ALLE 81.7 35 
OHT PTPT 4536 6.2 
OHT NISI 0 0 
OHT GTS1 19.2 0 
OHT MRIE 0 0 
OHT ELM2 4536 0 
OHT ELA2 4536 0 
OHT OHIO 81.7 0 
PTPT MONT 4536 12.1 
PTPT ALLT 4536 7 
PTPT OHT 4536 6.2 
TURR MONT 0 0 
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